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Liberalism's PublicIPrivate Split 
Betty Mensch and Alan Freeman 
N othing is more central to our experience in American culture than the split between public and private. It is the premise that lies at the 
foundation of American legal thought, and it also shapes 
the way in which we relate to one another in our daily 
lives. We take for granted that there is a public realm 
and a private realm. In  the private realm we assume 
that we operate within a protected sphere of autonomy, 
free to make choices and to be  secure against the 
encroachment of others. Private law (e.g., contract law) 
serves as a helpmate in this realm, facilitating and 
ensuring the autonomous world of private decision- 
making. In  contrast, the public realm is a world of 
governmental institutions obligated to serve the "public 
interest" rather than "private" aims. For the most part, 
the public realm is accountable to the private, and it is 
obligated to  limit its intrusion into the world of private 
choice; but occasionally it is supposed to  override the 
private sphere, either to  serve a greater public good or 
to solve problems that are poorly or  deficiently handled 
by private decision-making. 
While it is important to recognize the role of the 
private/public split in legal thought, its real significance 
lies in the powerful way it informs our  daily experience. 
Part of our reality is to "know" that the public realm is 
different from the private, that these realms are both 
"there" and separate from each other, with differnt 
things happening in each one. That knowledge, in turn, 
molds even our closest relationships. We were reminded 
of this fact recently during a phone conversation with 
a good friend. We had just produced a new baby, a fourth 
son in our busy household, and our. friend said she 
hoped we would now stop reproducing. Then she quickly 
retreated into apology, afraid she had offended us. At 
first her fear seemed puzzling, but  then it made sense: 
In  our culture one is not supposed to  tell people what 
one thinks of their reproductive behavior. Family plan- 
ning choices take place in the world of "family privacy," 
which is a world of private, autonomous decision 
making. Even friends are expected not to  intrude into 
that protected sphere; to  d o  so is to violate the norms 
of privacy. O u r  friend's apologetic manner is what we 
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mean by taking the public/private split for granted as 
part of our daily experience. 
A few moments of reflection, however, show the 
extent to which that supposed realm of privacy is a 
product of cultural contingency, not objective reality. 
Since reproduction, for example, is the process by which 
a society reconstitutes itself, many cultures consider 
family planning an obvious matter of social concern and 
choose accordingly either to encourage o r  discourage 
the creation of large families. Even in cultures where 
sexuality and reproduction are ostensibly "private," our 
experience of them is socially constituted. Unless one 
is prepared not only to head for the wilderness, but 
also to discard all previously acquired cultural baggage, 
the notion of raising children in "pure privacy" is an 
impossibility. We look, often frantically, to the social 
realm for guidance and understanding of parental roles. 
That we turn to Dr. Spock and other experts when we 
have difficulty as parents underscores the social dimen- 
sion of our experience. 
Once the public/private split is recognized to be  
merely an artificial construct, new possibilities for 
human contact arise. Where one erects walls of privacy 
around oneself, one  is denied access to others. Privacy 
means alienation, and if some of these walls of privacy 
were dissolved and traditionally private questions were 
transformed into community concerns, then we might 
feel more connected to others. Our  sense of ourselves 
and of others would change, and our world would, in 
turn, be  altered. 
Instead of attempting to transform the public realm 
into a genuine community, many of us seek authentic 
experiences by retreating into the private realm-by 
using the private realm as an antidote to  the alienating 
world of competitive, possessive, individualism. Thus, 
in the words of Christopher Lasch, the family is experi- 
enced as the "haven in a heartless world." Similarly, 
many of us try to find true meaning through religious 
experience and the social life that accompanies it. Finally, 
many of us think we achieve genuine interpersonal con- 
nection in the most private realm of all, when we fall 
in love. Yet the relegation of these experiences to the 
realm of privacy always serves to limit their significance. 
Because they are private they are trivialized and rendered 
irrelevant to  the "real world." 
Nevertheless, because our world is dominated by the 
forms of liberal legalism through which we bear "private 
rights," the rhetoric of militant privatism has provided 
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an important weapon in certain battles. As the Bork 
hearings illustrated, a threat to  our "right" to  privacy 
induces widespread fear and discomfort. I t  is true that 
in the abortion area gaining the right to private, auton- 
omous reproductive choice has seemed an important 
feminist victory. Yet the language of privatism is a 
double-edged sword. As women who struggle alone to 
raise children know, reproductive choice conceived only 
as a private right serves to isolate and deny the woman's 
claim for communal help and shared responsibility. To 
have "private" choice is also to be  left alone with it. 
Moreover, in the economic realm the rhetoric of privacy 
has traditionally been used to transform the social 
dimensions of poverty into a fantasy about autonomous 
choice in which poverty results from individual failure. 
It is therefore not surprising that the formal freedom 
to  obtain an abortion does not mean the right to have 
one paid for by the community; the poverty of the 
woman who cannot afford an abortion is her own 
"private" problem. That was the lesson learned when 
the supposedly liberating Roe v. Wade was followed by 
Harris v. McRae, which entitled the government to 
deny health benefits to low-income women to cover the 
expenses of even "medically necessary" abortions. 
Thus, within liberal legalism privacy may be a weapon 
to gain freedom from others in the short run, but it may 
provide the justification for abandonment of the in- 
dividual by others in the long run. This "short-run, 
long-run" problem can best b e  understood against a 
more general theoretical backdrop. For the purpose of 
understanding the ideology of private rights, nothing 
has really improved upon Marx's classic account in his 
early essay, "On  the Jewish Question." Despite the 
essay's somewhat heavy, dated, Hegelian terminology 
(state and civil society rather than simply public and 
private, for example), and its at times blatant anti- 
Semitism, it still remains the fullest account of liberal 
ideology. 
arx starts by describing the emancipation of 
the political state from the yoke of traditional 
status and power. Under the old feudal, hier- 
archial model, political life was inseparable from social 
privilege based on  religious, economic, and class back- 
ground. Because political status was bound u p  with 
social status, religious and property qualifications were 
attached to the right to vote. In  contrast, citizenship in 
the liberal state is freed of these qualifications: As 
citizen, the Jew is as free as the Christian, and the poor 
person is on an equal footing with the landed aristocrat. 
Thus, the state becomes the arena for the exercise of 
free political participation and the realization of true 
community. In  this sphere, at least, alienating religious 
and class divisions are dissolved. This liberation of the 
state has been "a great step forward," a step away from 
separateness and toward community (or, using Marx's 
term, "species being"). 
Nevertheless, the emancipation of the state has not 
brought complete human emancipation because the old 
distinctions have been retained "outside" the state, in the 
form of private rights. Thus, religion, rather than being 
abolished, becomes a "private whim," an expression of 
purely subjective, individualized value. Similarly, while 
property is no  longer a prerequisite for political partici- 
pation, it is nevertheless retained as a protected right 
with which the state cannot interfere. Property as a 
private right, stripped of the old notions of moral/ 
political obligation (e.g., the feudal lords to their serfs), 
both presupposes and legitimates a realm of egoism, 
self-interest, and atomization-i.e., the market. In that 
sphere there is only helium omnium contra ovzrzes, 
which, as Marx says, is "the essence not of community 
but  . . . of division." 
Instead of attempting to transform 
the public realm into a genuine 
community, many of us seek 
authentic experiences by retreating 
into the private realm. 
Marx insists that he is describing actual historical 
changes that took place when liberalism emerged, but 
he  is also describing a change in consciousness, in the 
way that people experience the world. The split between 
public and private lies at the heart of that liberal 
consciousness, for it means that we simultaneously view 
others both as fellow citizens in a true community and 
as separate, antagonistic private others. Thus, as Marx 
says, "man leads a double life . . . [I]n the political 
community he regards himself as a communalheing; but 
in civil society he is active as a private individual, treats 
other men as means, and becomes the plaything of 
alien powers." [Marx's emphasis] 
Moreover, because the most important daily activities 
-work, family life, and moral choice-are all experi- 
enced as private and apolitical, the experience of com- 
munity becomes increasingly abstract, realized at the 
level of fantasy and ritual rather than as concrete reality, 
Most "citizens" have little direct experience of partici- 
pation in collective decision-making, so each of them 
becomes an "imaginary member of an imagined sover- 
eignty." The "state," too, becomes an abstract, alien other, 
rather than an arena for the experience of community. 
Significantly, the public/private split also reproduces 
itself within the realm of the private, doing so most 
starkly in the markedfamily dichotomy. In theory, the 
market offers an arena for atomized, competitive self- 
interest, while the family provides a place for warmth, 
selflessness, and interconnectedness. Thus conceived, 
that dichotomy in turn represents the conventional, 
stereotypic split between male and female roles. For in 
the market, the most public and powerful of the private 
realms, men can play out their "maleness" by being 
aggressive and domineering, while women, contained 
within the family sphere, play out their female roles by 
providing a safe, nurturing home. Thus, the traditional 
rigidity of gender identification is inextricably linked to 
the supposed boundary between market and family, 
which in turn is an integral subset of the basic liberal 
split between public and private. 
A crucial ingredient in liberal ideology, as described 
by Marx, is the fact that the publidprivate split actually 
entails a tripartite structure of self, state, and other. 
Because of that structure, there is always an alienating 
third that mediates the relationship between self and 
other. Other "private" individuals are experienced, not 
in direct relationship, but rather by reference to a state 
that sets the ground rules of the relationship, determin- 
ing the extent of each person's rights and duties. In 
every relationship the state is a potential ally and a 
potential foe. At the same time, each individual experi- 
ences others simultaneously as citizens-part of the 
collectivity-and as private rights-holders. The state can 
never be simply the community because the community 
is composed of individuals who also define themselves 
as rights-holders with private interests potentially at 
odds both with the interests of others and with the 
collective experience. Just as each of us leads a "double 
life" as citizen and private rights-holder, so too do we 
constantly experience others, not as unified wholes, 
but as members of the "democratic" collectivity, on the 
one hand. and as atomized individuals on the other. 
T here are four important notions that, in tandem, help to maintain this triadic structure within our consciousness-to make it, in other words, 
powerful as ideology. These four notions can be called 
limit, illusion, legitimation, and contradiction. They 
operate simultaneously at the level of legal thought and 
at the level of day-to-day consciousness. 
The first, the notion of limit, means that there is a 
line separating public from private, a boundary where 
one ends and the other begins. That line can be moved 
dramatically over time, and it can sometimes be hard 
to find or quite fuzzy around the edges. But the key 
point is that the line is always present somewhere. On 
the public side of the line we assume that there is an 
obligation to act responsibly, with a sense of account- 
ability to others. The existence of a boundary, however, 
means that at some point accountability ends. 
The "state action" cases are all cases about this dual 
message of responsibility and limit. In these cases, the 
Supreme Court has been called upon to interpret the 
provision of the Fourteenth Amendment mandating 
that "No State shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." That 
provision makes racial discrimination a matter of public 
concern if the entity responsible for the discrimination 
can be regarded in some sense as the "state," i.e., public 
not private. In many instances the line between state 
action and private action has shifted dramatically, often 
in ways we consider progressive. 
One can applaud, for example, the change in this 
doctrine between the 1880s and the 1960s. In 1875, 
Congress enacted a law barring racial discrimination in 
places of public accommodation (hotels, theaters, etc.). 
In the Civil Rights Cases, however, the Supreme Court, 
invoking classic publidprivate assumptions, declared 
that the statute was an unconstitutional intrusion into 
the sphere of private social life. The limit to public 
accountability had been exceeded, since the Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibits discriminatory action only by 
the state. Not until the modern civil rights movement 
almost a hundred years later would similar legislation 
again be enacted; then, as we know, it was upheld. 
Yet the change did nothing to undermine the basic 
proposition that there is a line beyond which it is in- 
appropriate to hold the public accountable for racially 
discriminatory results. Thus, despite all of the legal 
advances in the area of antidiscrimination law, it is still 
legitimate to treat concrete social facts, such as continu- 
ing high rates of unemployment among minorities, 
high poverty rates, and basic exclusion from mainstream 
American life, as somehow outside the sphere of direct 
public responsibility. 
The notion of a limit on accountability works power- 
fully, not just in setting legal limits, but also in shaping 
our responses to the world. It allows us, for example, 
to interpret the social reality of minorities trapped in 
ghettos as a fact of private rather than public life, and 
therefore outside the range of our direct responsibility. 
As a result, empathetic responses ("I'd have a really 
hard time raising my children in those conditions too- 
I'd hate to see them feeling trapped and hopeless about 
the future") are always distorted by the assumption 
that the reality being witnessed is in the private realm- 
that it is shaped by free choice and is not the result of 
public coercion. 
This is not to say, of course, that the notion of 
privatism is the only distancing mechanism shaping our 
perceptions. The feudal model of divinely ordained 
hierarchy, now supposedly defunct, remains alive in the 
form of stereotypical assumptions about lower classes, 
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women, and minorities. "They" are not really like "us"; 
they are not bothered by conditions that would bother 
us; it is more natural for them to live like that. 
Another vestige of the hierarchical view can be found 
in our modern notion of merit. A sophisticated version 
of divinely ordained hierarchy, one more consistent 
with the public/private split, this notion assumes that 
there is a natural ordering of abilities-one independent 
of class, sex, or race-that determines outcomes in a 
free society. Given equal opportunity, the skillful, the 
daring, and the hardworking will be the ones who 
come out ahead. The belief in objective merit, however 
at odds with reality, has of course played a key role in 
the ideology of the free market-success in the market- 
place reflects "natural ability" rather than socially con- 
stituted hierarchy. 
Even if we reject all such assumptions about the 
legitimacy of social hierarchies, we still may be unable 
to transcend the distancing effect of the public/private 
split. In fact, we are almost inevitably trapped by it. 
Should we attempt to recognize that the problems of 
others are our concerns, we would hardly know how to 
begin to cope with them. In the absence of genuine 
shared communal responsibility, gestures of concern 
are quickly turned into idle, private, and frequently 
condescending acts of charity. If we donate money to 
"toys for tots" or to the church soup kitchen, we are, 
to be sure, providing a toy for a child, or a meal for a 
hungry person, but we are also affirming the regime of 
nonresponsibility that makes the act of charity one 
chosen by subjective whim. Given the public/private 
split, we are forced to be selfish as much as we choose 
to be selfish, for in the absence of real community, our 
communal gestures can only be privately expressed. In 
the private realm, where free choice is presumably 
protected, none of us is free to choose the rejection of 
privacy itself because others will quickly respond to 
such efforts as intrusive, threatening, or simply crazy. 
This lack of freedom to choose a community of real 
sharing is closely connected to the second notion that 
makes the public/private split so effective-illusion. 
The existence of a public realm allows us to believe 
that, the force of the private sphere notwithstanding, 
in the public sphere we are together as citizens, partici- 
pating equally and fully. The public realm constantly 
holds out the possibility of community even while the 
reality of daily life denies it. Because that daily denial 
is so pervasive, the ideal of public community must 
constantly be affirmed through the social production of 
imagery in order to prevent us from directly confronting 
our loneliness and isolation. We must have the illusion 
of communal experience, even if reality does not bear 
it out. The media have become especially effective 
conveyors of this illusion, for the shared television 
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viewing of national events provides the feeling that we 
are all participating in national life. Although in fact 
we are only passive viewers of an image, we feel that 
we are joined with others, taking part in the life of the 
country. The recent Miss Liberty and Constititution 
Bicentennial celebrations provided ceremonial versions 
of that illusory experience, but so-called national 
tragedies also have a similar effect. President Reagan 
has been especially adept at using funerals for this pur- 
pose, simultaneously masking underlying problems of 
corruption and ineptitude, as in the space shuttle 
explosion. 
As Reagan also demonstrated in his first years in office, 
the illusion of the public community can be strengthened 
through the identification of enemies. We have seen 
him create such enemies in Khomeini, in "International 
Terrorism" and, most effectively, in Khadafy. Figures 
like Khadafy serve a useful ideological purpose: How- 
ever separate and private we are otherwise, we, "as a 
nation,"-as members of an illusory community-can 
share our hatred for him. 
s trengthening the image of public togetherness in turn facilitates the third notion associated with the public/private split-legitimation. With the 
illusion of togetherness intact, we deem it acceptable 
to be acquisitive and competitive in the private sphere, 
to scorn others and to take advantage of their weak- 
nesses. Disparities of wealth and power that result 
from this social and economic Bellum omnium contra 
omnes are by definition legitimate because they are a 
function of private, autonomous choice, not the public 
exercise of political power. To redress these disparities 
would be to invade the protected sphere of private 
rights. 
Legitimation requires an elaborate structure of law 
to maintain the theoretical distinction between public 
and private activity. It is the conception of legally 
enforceable rights that gives credibility to the assumption 
that private activity is in fact purely private, so that the 
exercise of private power does not appear to be publicly 
sanctioned oppression. Thus, public law is to be distin- 
guished from private law-property, torts, and contracts 
w h i c h  simply facilitates the private ordering of social 
and economic life. Private law doctrine is thus a long 
and detailed meditation on the idea of protected free 
choice within a fixed and judicially determined limit. 
Legally determinable rights ensure that each person is 
secure against both public coercion and oppressive 
private power. 
Private rights, however, are, necessarily, not only 
about freedom, but about exclusion as well. The positive 
side of free choice always carries with it a negative flip 
side: This is mine, therefore it's not yours. I've got it so 
you don't. Similarly, while there is a positive side to 
recognizing the other as a rights-holder ("I respect 
your autonomy, your right to make your own choices"), 
there is a negative side as well, because rights are 
premised on the denial of the freedom to share. ("Be- 
cause you have it, it's not mine; because it's yours, I 
cannot have it without your consent.") Of course, a 
major premise of traditional marketplace theory is that 
"consent" is something that must be purchased, experi- 
enced as a barrier, thereby alienating the other from 
oneself. 
In truth, the line between public and private is logic- 
ally incoherent, and this incoherence has been apparent 
since the Legal Realist movement of the 1920s and 30s. 
The realist scholars, part of the general twentieth-century 
revolt against formalism and conceptualism, convincingly 
undermined all faith in the objective existence of "rights" 
by challenging the ideological premises upon which the 
public/private distinction is based. 
Property, for example, is thought to be the paradig- 
matic private right. In his famous essay, "Property and 
Sovereignty," Morris Cohen pointed out that property 
is necessarily public, not private, since "property" means 
the legally granted power to withhold from others; and 
as such, it is created and protected by the state. In 
short, property law is simply a form of public law. 
Similarly, with respect to freedom of contract, the power 
to exclude or withhold is central to the supposedly 
freely-entered bargain. Free consent to the other's terms 
is in fact forced consent, for it derives from the other's 
legally sanctioned threat to withhold what is owned 
except upon the demanded payment. It is the state that 
delegates the power to exclude and therefore to set the 
terms: without public coercion, there would be no 
private freedom of contract. Thus, the line between 
private right and public power dissolves-the former 
collapses into the latter. 
Despite its apparent incoherence, however, the lan- 
guage of public and private persists, both in legal 
discourse and as part of our experience. Its continuing 
viability and power to legitimate may be due, in large 
part, to its manipulability. Precisely because it has no 
logical content at all, it can easily be  turned inside out. 
The legal literature is filled, for example, with theoretical 
invocations of public welfare to justify the consolidation 
of hierarchical property relations. Thus, in the typical 
exclusionary zoning case, the supposedly free private 
market would allow developers to subdivide building 
lots and erect cheap housing in otherwise fancy (usually 
all-white) neighborhoods. In such situations, the "com- 
munity" is allowed to establish rules to prevent the 
erection of such cheap housing, despite the fact that 
the community with its "police power" is being invoked 
simply to reinforce private acquisitive, racist behavior. 
Similarly, the public purpose doctrine has been in- 
voked repeatedly to justify subsidies to enterprises that 
28 TIKKUN VOL. 3, No. 2 
otherwise claim the right to be treated as private. 
Historically, railroads were notorious beneficiaries: the 
state's eminent domain rights were granted to railway 
companies on  the theory that the public would benefit 
from an expanding transportation system, even while the 
companies of course retained their right to a "private" 
profit. 
M odern examples abound. Conventional free market ideology extols the virtues of private capital accumulation, entrepreneurial skill, 
and the harsh reality of risk. Yet tax breaks are routinely 
granted to entice industries to invest or remain in 
localities, cities compete for the opportunity to provide 
sports teams with ever more luxurious stadiums, and 
huge companies get government help when they face 
financial ruin. Private companies rarely turn down the 
opportunity to eat greedily from the public trough. 
Two recent cases serve to illustrate the point. In  the 
first, Poletown Neighborhood Council u. City o f  Detroit, 
the Michigan Supreme C.ourt invoked the public char- 
acter of large private enterprise in allowing a whole 
neighborhood in Detroit to be destroyed, at huge per- 
sonal cost to displaced neighborhood residents, so that 
General Motors could build a plant on that location. 
The theory was that public good would result from the 
plant's opening because the plant would provide jobs. 
Ironically, however, in Local 1330, United Stcrltuorkcm 
u. U.S. Steel, an appellate court affirmed the privateness 
of large corporations and refused to stop the closing of 
two plants in Youngstown, Ohio, despite the court's 
stated awareness that the move would cause "an econ- 
omic tragedy of major proportion'' in the area. Rejecting 
the argument that the local community had gained a 
recognizable property interest or  community "right" in 
the plants over the years, the court held that because 
the company was privately owned, its economic decisions 
were beyond public reach. 
The point here is not that the courts were wrong in 
attempting to make their public/private decisions, but 
rather that anything can be  described as either public 
or private. Decisions during the 1985-86 Supreme Court 
term illustrated that point vividly. The Court refused to 
hold airlines sufficiently "public" to be  required to 
comply with antidiscrimination laws with respect to the 
treatment of the handicapped, despite the quite apparent 
subsidization of comnlercial airlines through the air 
traffic controller system (a "public" service, as Reagan 
was at pains to point out when the controllers went on 
strike and he fired them, which he could not have done 
if they were in the "private" sector). Then, only a couple 
of weeks later, in the famous Bowers v. Ha~dwzck case, 
the Court announced that even voluntary consensual 
sexual acts were not sufficiently private to preclude 
state regulation. While the act that was upheld was 
apparently directed at homosexuals, on whom the Court 
has never conferred "rights" as such, the Court did not 
seem to preclude regulation of sexual acts even between 
husband and wife. In effect, that which seems the most 
private was declared public, while that which seems (as 
we stand in line at a busy airport waiting for a security 
check) most public, is declared private. Paradoxically, 
the legal system defines the world for us as public and 
private; and then, through its particular definitions, it is 
free to stand in dramatic contrast to our daily experience. 
The indeterminacy of the public/private split is closely 
related to the fourth associated notion-contradiction. 
As the airline/sexuality pairing denlonstrates, neither 
the public nor the private category has any objective 
content. As a result, contradictory arguments about 
private rights can always be  generated. As a matter of 
pure logic, nothing is excluded from the state's legitimate 
concern for the public welfare. Similarly, as between 
two conflicting private rights, logical arguments can 
always be made for either side. My private right to be 
secure from the invasion of a nuisance, like the smelly 
chemicals you spray on your lawn, conflicts with your 
right to use your property freely. My right to  be secure 
from oppressive competition conflicts with your right 
to engage in unbridled freedom of contract. In each 
instance, the state must choose between two mutually 
exclusive rights. 
In the economic realm the rhetoric 
of privacy has traditionally been 
used to transform the social 
dimensions of poverty into a fantasy 
about autonomous choice in which 
poverty results/rom individual 
failure. 
Others have written about the problem of contradic- 
tion, which belies the legal system's claim to be a 
neutral protector of rights. Contradiction also is mani- 
fcstecl in our personal experience-in our sense of how 
we should relate to others. The contradiction between 
market freedom and security of expectations that per- 
vades private law discourse reflects deeply held beliefs 
about how we should act in the world, beliefs that 
are ultimately contradictory. O n  the one hand, we 
believe that we should be  free to take advantage of 
another's weakness in the market, but on the other 
hand, we feel obliged to respect the interests of others. 
First-year law students are genuinely troubled when 
they discover that contract law, for example, does not 
have a convincing answer to the question of where 
self-interest ends and concern for another's security 
begins. What their unhappiness reveals is that they 
believe in both the free exercise of self-interest and in 
the good-faith protection of others. They then find 
themselves feeling immobilized: in the face of evident 
contradiction, how can one make a strong moral choice? 
The same feeling that law students begin to recognize 
self-consciously is experienced by most people as an 
iinarticulated sense of moral immobilization. 
T he fact that contradiction undermines the legal system's claim to be a neutral protector of rights also intensifies the degree to which the triadic 
structure of state/self/other pervades our relationships. 
At any given time, one's position with respect to another 
has to be seen as a function of a series of logically in- 
coherent choices the state has made, choices that some- 
times are favorable and sometimes antagonistic. If you 
complain about your neighbor's barking dog, the police 
may give your neighbor a hard time, or they may tell 
you that "life is like that." They may show up next time, 
having been called by your neighbor, to make you mow 
your overgrown weed-filled lawn, or you may convince 
them that you are an ecologist legitimately excercising 
your right to experiment with "natural" lawn. The fact 
that these choices cannot be preordained or logically 
compelled makes us feel the state's power all the more 
acutely. 
As women who struggle alone to 
raise children know, reproductive 
choice conceived only as a private 
right serves to isolate and to deny 
the woman? claim for communal 
help and shared responsibility. To 
have "private" choice is also to be 
left alone with it. 
It is common, however, especially among liberals, to 
consider problematic certain parts of the public/private 
distinction, while at the same time assuming that there 
is some core meaning to the notion of privacy, one that 
is natural rather than simply a creation of legal/political 
ideology. Thus, one might quite willingly concede that 
Con Edison is not obviously and perfectly private, but 
what about my home, my body, my thoughts? 
Even in such cases, however, the supposed core right 
to privacy can be collapsed into contradiction. Thus, 
my freedom to keep a goat in my home and ~ a r d  
conflicts with my neighbors' collective right to be secure 
in the respectability of the neighborhood in which they 
have invested; and one person's right to the free enjoy- 
ment of sexual fantasy conflicts with another's right to 
be secure against the degrading and exploitative use of 
bodies. Moreover, as in the market, so too, even within 
the family, we can have no faith in the supposed purity 
of private, subjective consent, for consent is always in 
part a function of social roles and expectations. A 
wife's consent to sexual relations with her husband, for 
example, is in part publicly constructed, for in every 
instance we all, inescapably, act out the social repre- 
sentations of the roles assigned to us-the wife's consent 
is inevitably consent by a person who thinks of herself 
as "wife," and this publicly created consciousness informs 
even her most private, subjective decisions. 
If the structure of private rights and state power 
renders incoherent the vocabulary of rights, how then 
can we affirm the values that seem most important to 
us? Feminists, for example, feel deeply divided on the 
question of pornography. In light of the debasing use 
of female bodies, we are tempted to seek protection. 
The state should guarantee our security against such 
exploitation irrespective of the pornographer's invoca- 
tion of a private right to freedom of speech. Yet the 
same state that might side with us now could also end 
up as the ally of the Phyllis Schlaflys of the world who 
wish to oppress us with their conventionality. And the 
same First Amendment invoked by our exploitative 
enemy may in the future protect us against state power. 
Is there, even imaginably, a radical alternative view 
that does not require us to go on living the public/private 
split? Two related agendas suggest themselves. One  is 
to recognize that the decision to employ the rhetoric of 
privacy is just that, a strategic move, and that the real 
solution is to end the relations of power that permeate 
our society. From that perspective, the issue is not 
privacy as such, but how to fashion a world without our 
current hierarchies of power, one of which is the physical 
abuse of women by men. That suggests the other agenda 
-the fashioning of communities where one need not 
hide behind the "private" either for protection or self- 
aggrandizement, where relationships might be  just "us" 
" y o u ,  and me, and the rest of usn-deciding for 
ourselves what we want, without the alienating third of 
t h e  state." In that setting, however remote it may 
seem, we might even make group decisions about 
reproduction, replacing our pervasive alienation and 
fear of one another with something more like mutual 
trust, or  love. 0 
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